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Abstract
We present a novel scheme for controlled quantum secure communi-
cation (CQSC) using GHZ-like state. In this scheme, a trusted controller
assists the users for achieving secure transmission of data between them.
The dense coding technique is exploited to increase the qubit efficiency
and we show that the proposed scheme is immune against common eaves-
dropping attacks. We show how the method can be generalized to include
N controllers using sets of GHZ-like states shared among the controllers
and users. In this process entanglement swapping and single particle mea-
surements are performed by the controllers to relax their controls and the
users get entangled in Bell states.
1 Introduction
Quantum Cryptography has emerged as area of research in recent times. It
is recognized that quantum processors can supersede current classical crypto-
graphic protocols and offer highly secure cryptographic protocols for quantum
communication. In 1984, Bennett and Brassard[1] proposed the pioneering work
in Quantum Key Distribution (QKD), popularly known as BB84 protocol. This
work motivated the scientific community to exploit the intriguing features of of
quantum mechanics to get more secure and efficient cryptographic protocols. In
QKD, initially a secret quantum key is established between communicating par-
ties and then this key is used for encryption and decryption of the message which
is sent classically by Alice(sender) to Bob(receiver). With further developments
in quantum cryptography, two other kinds of protocols were proposed. These
are the quantum secure direct communication(QSDC)[2, 3, 4] scheme and the
deterministic secure quantum communication(DSQC)[5, 6, 7] scheme. Unlike
QKD, the QSDC and DSQC techniques do not require previously shared key
for communication: the secret messages are communicated directly. However,
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there is a slight difference between QSDC and DSQC. The later requires at least
one bit of classical information to decode each qubit of the secret message and
in the case of QSDC there is no requirement of any additional classical bit to
decode the secret message[8, 9, 10]. Different QSDC and DSQC schemes have
been proposed employing different entangled states such as EPR pairs[7, 11],
GHZ states[5, 12], GHZ-like states[8, 13], W states[14, 15] etc. Moreover, there
are schemes employing different methods such as dense coding[4], entanglement
swapping[5], teleportation[6] etc for transmitting the secret message.
Recently, another kind of quantum communication scheme with the inclu-
sion of a controller who controls the whole communication has been put forward
by many research groups[9, 10, 13, 16]. In this scheme, designated as Controlled
Quantum Secure Direct Communication(CQSDC), the co-operation of the con-
troller is essential for the successful communication between the legitimate users.
In practical situations all users prefer a smaller system than the service provider.
Therefore, it is meaningful to have a controller to prepare the state when it is
needed for communication and have a control over the communication without
the capability of accessing the secret message. In a recent work, Pathak[10]
pointed out that, since in the proposed methods an additional classical bit from
the controller is required to decode the secret message, it is more appropriate
to name this as CDSQC (Controlled Secure Direct Quantum Communication)
instead of CQSDC.
In this paper we propose a new controlled quantum communication protocol
making use of GHZ-like states[17, 18] and dense coding[19]. This is achieved
by exploiting a unique GHZ-like state: the entanglement between two particles
remain even after a measurement is made on one of the particles[9, 20]. Since,
in the proposed scheme the communication between the legitimate users start
only after receiving a classical bit from the controller, we designate our protocol
as Controlled Quantum Secure Communication(CQSC), eventhough the com-
munication as such is purely QSDC. The generalization of our protocol to N
number of controllers is presented, where the controllers perform entanglement
swapping also.
This paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we describe the CQSC
using a GHZ-like state and dense coding. In section 3 we extend our scheme to
CQSC with two controllers and in section 4 with three controllers. In section
5 the method is generalized to the case of N number of controllers (MCQSC).
Analysis of the security and efficiency of the proposed CQSC protocol is given
in section 6. Our conclusions are presented in section 7.
2 Controlled Quantum Secure Communication
using a GHZ-like state
A GHZ-like state can be prepared from a single qubit state, Bell pair with a
controlled-NOT operation as given in references[8, 9]. The set of eight orthonor-
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mal GHZ-like states[9] is given by,
|ζ000〉 = 1√
2
[
∣∣φ+〉 |0〉+ ∣∣ψ+〉 |1〉], |ζ001〉 = 1√
2
[
∣∣φ+〉 |1〉+ ∣∣ψ+〉 |0〉]
|ζ010〉 = 1√
2
[
∣∣φ+〉 |0〉 − ∣∣ψ+〉 |1〉], |ζ011〉 = 1√
2
[
∣∣φ+〉 |1〉 − ∣∣ψ+〉 |0〉]
|ζ100〉 = 1√
2
[
∣∣φ−〉 |0〉+ ∣∣ψ−〉 |1〉], |ζ101〉 = 1√
2
[
∣∣φ−〉 |1〉+ ∣∣ψ−〉 |0〉]
|ζ110〉 = 1√
2
[
∣∣φ−〉 |0〉 − ∣∣ψ−〉 |1〉], |ζ111〉 = 1√
2
[
∣∣φ−〉 |1〉 − ∣∣ψ−〉 |0〉]
where, |φ±〉 and |ψ±〉 represents the Bell states.∣∣φ±〉 = 1√
2
[|00〉 ± |11〉], ∣∣ψ±〉 = 1√
2
[|01〉 ± |10〉]
In this protocol, we consider Alice as the sender who wants to send secret
message to Bob the receiver and Charlie controls the communication. The
proposed CQSC consists of the following steps,
(a) (b)
Figure 1: CQSC with one controller, (a) initially shared GHZ-like state among
the controller and the communicators Alice and Bob, (b) after the Z basis
measurement by the controller C, the particles a and b become entangled.
CQSC 1: Charlie prepares N number of GHZ-like state of the form,
|ζ000〉 = 1
2
[|000〉+ |011〉+ |110〉+ |101〉]abc (1)
This can also be written as,
|ζ000〉 = [(|φ
+〉 |0〉+ |ψ+〉 |1〉)√
2
]abc (2)
in the Z basis and as
|ζ000〉 = 1
2
[|+ + +〉+ |− − −〉]abc (3)
in the X basis.
Charlie, now, has in his possession a sequence of N number of GHZ-like state
[P1(a)P1(b)P1(c), P2(a)P2(b)P2(c), .., PN (a)PN (b)PN (c)], where the a,b,c repre-
sents three particles in the GHZ-like state and the subscript represents the order.
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Charlie divides the sequence into three, ‘a’ sequence : [P1(a)P2(a)P3(a), .., PN
(a)], ‘b’ sequence: [P1(b)P2(b)P3(b), .., PN (b)] and ‘c’ sequence: [P1(c)P2(c)P3(c)
, .., PN (c)]. Charlie then sends the ‘a’ sequence to Alice, ‘b’ sequence to Bob and
retains the ‘c’ sequence with himself. The communicating parties are already
aware of the shared GHZ-like state.
CQSC 2: The controller Charlie randomly selects a sufficiently large subset
of particles from his ‘c’ sequence for the first eavesdrop checking. These parti-
cles are then measured in either Z or X basis at random. Later the position of
the sample particles and the basis chosen for measurement are announced via
a public channel. Alice and Bob choose the same basis to measure the corre-
sponding particle in their sequence. When Alice and Bob tell their measurement
results to Charlie, he can find out the error rate. From equation 1, if Charlie
gets |0〉c in the Z basis measurement, then the results of Alice and Bob are cor-
related and if Charlie gets |1〉c, then their results are anti-correlated. Similarly
results corresponding to Charlie’s measurement in X basis are related as given
in equation 3. They continue to the next step if the error rate is low, otherwise
they abort the communication and start from the first step on a later occasion.
CQSC 3: After the first eavesdrop check, the controller performs Z-basis
measurement on the remaining particles in the ‘c’ sequence. This measurement
allows the controller to disentangle all particles in the ‘c’ sequence from the
sequences ‘a’ and ‘b’. At this stage Alice and Bob share Bell pairs according
to equation 2 as is pictorially shown in figure 1. However, Charlie shares his
measurement result only with Bob through a classical channel. This allows the
receiver to have an advantage over eavesdropper. Now Bob and Charlie alone
know which Bell pair is shared between Alice and Bob, since they already have
information about the initially shared GHZ-like state.
CQSC 4: To enhance the security, Bob does any one of the four unitary
operations I, σx, σz, iσy randomly on his ‘b’ sequence [P1(b)P2(b)P3(b), .., PN (b)]
remaining after the first eavesdrop check. These operations transform the Bell
states shared between Alice and Bob accordingly. This transformation protects
the information about the shared entanglement between the users also from
controller’s knowledge. Now, only Bob knows which are the shared Bell pairs.
Bob informs Alice that he is ready to receive the message.
Unitary operation Encoded message
performed by Alice
I 00
σx 01
σz 10
iσy 11
Table 1: Unitary operations and the corresponding encoded message
CQSC 5: After receiving the confirmation from Bob, Alice encodes her
secret message to the ‘a’ sequence [P1(a)P2(a)P3(a), .., PN (a)] remaining with
her after the first eavesdrop check. For encoding the secret message Alice uses
one of the four unitary operations I, σx, σz, iσy and each one corresponding
to two bit of information as shown in table 1. Before encoding the message,
Alice inserts sufficient decoy photons in her sequence in order to confuse the
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eavesdropper in decoding the secret message. This process would improve the
security of the protocol. Now Alice sends her encoded ‘a’ sequence along with
the decoy photons to Bob through a quantum channel as in the case of dense
coding[19].
CQSC 6: After receiving the encoded message sequence from Alice, Bob
sends a confirmation signal back to Alice. On receiving the confirmation mes-
sage from Bob, Alice announces the positions and the basis of the decoy photons.
Bob will measure the decoy photons in the respective basis and tells his result
to Alice so that she can calculate the error rate. Now, Bob has both the qubits
of the EPR pair. On these transformed EPR pairs, Bob performs Bell basis
measurements. With the knowledge of the unitary operation that he has earlier
done on the ‘b’ sequence before the encoding process and with the Bell mea-
surement results, Bob can obtain the secret message sent by Alice. Since Bob
initially changed the state, Eve(the eavesdropper) will get nothing even if she
eavesdrops.
For an example, consider that Alice wants to send a 6 bit message, say,
100101 to Bob. Let |ζ000〉 = [ (|φ
+〉|0〉+|ψ+〉|1〉)√
2
]ABC be the GHZ-like state shared
among the two users Alice and Bob, and the controller Charlie. They need
three sets of GHZ-like state after the first eavesdrop check to send this 6 bit of
information. Alice, Bob and Charlie share the set of three GHZ-like state as
elaborated in CQSC:1 of our protocol. After the first eavesdrop check as per
CQSC:2, Charlie measures his C-sequence as explained in CQSC: 3 and informs
Bob about his measurement. Let Charlie’s measurement results be |0〉 , |1〉 and
|0〉 so that the shared Bell states between Alice and Bob are |φ+〉 , |ψ+〉 and
|φ+〉 respectively. Then Bob randomly select any three unitary operations as
explained in CQSC:4, which makes him the only user who knows the shared
Bell state. For instance, say, Bob selects σx, I and σz respectively to operate
his B sequence, then the shared Bell states transform to |ψ+〉 , |ψ+〉 and |φ−〉.
Now Alice encodes her message on her A sequence using unitary operations as
explained in CQSC: 5. To send 100101, she selects σz, σx and σx respectively to
operate on her qubits. Alice’s operation transform the Bell pairs to |ψ−〉 , |φ+〉
and |ψ−〉. Alice sends her encoded sequence to Bob after inserting decoy photons
to check error rate as explained in CQSC: 6. After removing the decoy photos
Bob does Bell measurement on the Bell pair. His measurement result for this
particular example is 110011. With the knowledge of shared Bell pair before
encoding the message, Bob can analyse the operation done by Alice and hence
gets the secret message 100101.
3 CQSC with two controllers
Here we elaborate our protocol on how to realise the communication between
Alice and Bob with the help of two trusted controllers C1 and C2. It requires
two sets of GHZ-like states to achieve this two-controller communication. The
CQSC scheme is explained in following steps,
2CQSC 1: The controller C1 prepares N number of two sets of GHZ-like
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(a) (b)
(c)
Figure 2: CQSC with two controllers, (a) initially shared GHZ-like states among
the two controllers and the communicators, (b) the controller C2 measures his
two particles p2 and p
′
2 in Z basis, this changes the particles p
′
1 and a , p1 and
b to Bell pairs, (c) the controller C1 swaps his particles p1 and p
′
1, which turns
the particles a and b to Bell pair.
state, in the states |ζ1〉 and |ζ2〉.
|ζ1〉 = [(|φ
+〉 |0〉+ |ψ+〉 |1〉)√
2
]p′1ap′2 (4)
|ζ2〉 = [(|φ
+〉 |0〉+ |ψ+〉 |1〉)√
2
]p1bp2 (5)
The first set of GHZ-like state is composed of three particles (p′1, a and p
′
2) and
those in second set of GHZ-like state are (p1, b and p2). The ordered sequence of
the two set of GHZ-like state is given by [P1(p
′
1)P1(a)P1(p
′
2), P2(p
′
1)P2(a)P2(p
′
2)
, ..., PN (p
′
1)PN (a)PN (p
′
2)] and [P1(p1)P1(b)P1(p2), P2(p1)P2(b)P2(p2), .., PN (p1)
PN (b)PN (p2)]. The controller C1 divides the two set of GHZ-like states into six
sequences: [p′1, a, p
′
2, p1, b, p2] and distribute the sequences among the users and
controllers as follows. Sequences p2: [P1(p2)P2(p2), .., PN (p2)], p
′
2: [P1(p
′
2)P2(p
′
2)
, ., PN (p
′
2)] are given to the controller C2 and sequences a: [P1(a)P2(a), .., PN (a)],
b: [P1(b)P2(b), .., PN (b)] are given to the users Alice and Bob respectively. The
remaining two sequences c1: [P1(p1)P2(p1), .., PN (p1)] and p
′
1: [P1(p
′
1)P2(p
′
1), ..,
PN (p
′
1)] are retained by C1. The controllers and the two communicating parties
are aware of the shared GHZ-like state.
2CQSC 2: The controller C2 initiates the first eavesdrop check by choosing
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a large subset of particles from the sequence p2 and p
′
2 and measures the particles
randomly in X or Z basis. Then C2 announces the measurement basis and the
result in a public channel. Based on the information published by C2 Alice and
Bob performs measurement on the corresponding particles in their sequence in
same basis as chosen by C2. Alice and Bob share their results to the controller
C1 and in turn C1 measures the corresponding particles in p1 and p
′
1 sequence
in the same basis as choosen by C2. By comparing the measurement results, C1
can find the error rate. If the error rate is below the threshold, they continue
their communication, otherwise C1 informs others to abort the communication
and start the whole process from the beginning.
2CQSC 3: After the eavesdrop check, the controller C1 insists C2 to mea-
sure the two particles sequences p2 and p
′
2 in Z basis. As a result of these
measurements entanglement is established between pairs (p′1, a) and (p1, b) ac-
cording to equation 4 and 5, as shown in figure: 2(b). After the public announce-
ment of measurement results by controller C2, C1 performs bell measurement
on two sequence p1 and p
′
1 in order. This measurement allows entanglement to
be established between sequences a and b. The Bell measurement result of C1
is shared with the receiver Bob and then the communication proceeds as in one
controller case as explained in previous section, in step CQSC 4. The possible
measurement outputs of the two controllers and the shared Bell pair between
the sender and receiver is given in table: 2.
C2 C1 Shared bell pair
(p′2 p2) (p
′
1 p1) between Alice and Bob
0 0 0 0 |φ+〉
0 1 |ψ+〉
1 0 |φ−〉
1 1 |ψ−〉
0 1 0 0 |ψ+〉
0 1 |φ+〉
1 0 |ψ−〉
1 1 |φ−〉
1 0 0 0 |ψ+〉
0 1 |φ+〉
1 0 |ψ−〉
1 1 |φ−〉
1 1 0 0 |φ+〉
0 1 |ψ+〉
1 0 |φ−〉
1 1 |ψ−〉
Table 2: CQSC with two controllers
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4 CQSC with three controllers
In the case of three controller QSC, we consider C1, C2 and C3 as the trusted
controllers. Here again we need only two sets of GHZ-like state to realise three-
party Controlled quantum secure communication between legitimate users. The
3CQSC scheme is explained as follows.
(a) (b)
(c)
Figure 3: CQSC with three controllers, (a) initially shared GHZ-like states
among the three controllers and the communicators, (b) the controller C2 and
C3 measures their particles p2 and p3 in Z basis, this changes the particles p
′
1
and a , p1 and b to Bell pairs, (c) the controller C1 swaps his particles p1 and
p′1, which turns the particles a and b to Bell pair.
3CQSC 1: The controller C1 prepares N number of two sets of GHZ-like
state {|ζ1〉, |ζ2〉} and distributes the particles among the other controller C2, C3
and the users a and b. Let the two sets of GHZ-like state be,
|ζ1〉 = [(|φ
+〉 |0〉+ |ψ+〉 |1〉)√
2
]p′1ap2 (6)
|ζ2〉 = [(|φ
+〉 |0〉+ |ψ+〉 |1〉)√
2
]p1bp3 (7)
where, (p′1, a and p2) represents particles that belong to the first set of GHZ-like
state |ζ1〉 and particles (p1, b and p3) belong to the second set |ζ2〉. Now the
controller C1 divides the N number of GHZ-like states in to six sequences: {p′1,
8
a, p2, p1, b, p3} and distributes it among the controllers and users as follows.
The sequences p2 : [P1(p2)P2(p2), .., PN (p2)], p3: [P1(p3)P2(p3), .., PN (p3)] and
a:[P1(a)P2(a), .., PN (a)], b: [P1(b)P2(b), .., PN (b)] are given to Controllers C2,
C3 and users a, b respectively. The remaining sequences c
′
1: [P1(p
′
1)P2(p
′
1), .., PN
(p′1)] and p1: [P1(p1)P2(p1), .., PN (p1)] are retained by the Controller C1. Here
the shared GHZ-like states are known to the controllers and the two communi-
cating parties.
3CQSC 2: For the first eavesdrop checking, the controllers C2 and C3
chooses a large subset of particles with the same order from the sequence p2, p3
and measures the particles randomly in X or Z basis. They announce their mea-
surement basis and results in a public channel. Using the obtained information,
Alice and Bob chooses the corresponding particles with same order from the
sequences a, b and selects measurement basis same as that of C2 and C3 respec-
tively. Their measurement results are communicated only with the controller
C1. Later, C1 measures the corresponding particles in the p
′
1, p1 sequences with
the same order in the basis same as that of C2 and C3 respectively. By compar-
ing the results of other users, C1 can calculate the error rate. If the error rate
is low they proceed to the next step, otherwise they abort the communication
and start from the beginning.
3CQSC 3: The controllers C2 and C3 are instructed to measure their parti-
cle sequences p2 and p3 in Z basis. The measurement of p2 allows the Controller
C1 and the sender Alice to share Bell pairs as in equation 6. Similarly the mea-
surement of p3 allows the Controller C1 and the receiver Bob to share Bell pairs
according to equation 7. The entanglement relation between the particles after
the measurements are pictorially shown in figure: 3(b). The controller C2 and
C3 announce their results publicly. After this announcement the controller C1
performs bell measurement on the two sequence p1 and p
′
1 with the same order.
This in turn swaps the entanglement between C1 and users to only among user
sequences a and b as shown in figure: 3(c). The Bell measurement results of
C1 is shared with the receiver Bob and now the communication proceeds as in
one controller case CQSC 4. The possible measurement results of the three
controllers and the shared Bell pair between the sender and receiver is given in
table 3 and is similar as the case of two controllers.
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C3 C2 C1 Shared bell pair
(p3) (p2) (p
′
1 p1) between Alice and Bob
0 0 0 0 |φ+〉
0 1 |ψ+〉
1 0 |φ−〉
1 1 |ψ−〉
0 1 0 0 |ψ+〉
0 1 |φ+〉
1 0 |ψ−〉
1 1 |φ−〉
1 0 0 0 |ψ+〉
0 1 |φ+〉
1 0 |ψ−〉
1 1 |φ−〉
1 1 0 0 |φ+〉
0 1 |ψ+〉
1 0 |φ−〉
1 1 |ψ−〉
Table 3: CQSC with three controllers
5 Generalized controlled Quantum Secure Com-
munication
In this section, we generalize our protocol for CQSC with N trusted controllers.
Let C1, C2, C3...CN denote the N controllers. The particle distribution of each
GHZ-like state among the controllers and total number of GHZ-like states re-
quired for establishing the protocol can be found from the equations given below.
Here, each line represents an entangled set of GHZ-like state.
For odd number of controllers:{
p′N−1
2
, p′N−3
2
, pN+1
2
}
(8)
Equation: 8, represents the three particles from the first set of entangled GHZ-
like state. The number in subscript represents the identity of each controller and
it depends on the total number of odd controllers, N. These particles are send
to different controllers based on the value in the subscript. The remaining set of
GHZ-like states is distributed among the controllers according to the following
pattern: {
pN−(2m+1)
2
, p′N−(2m+5)
2
, pN+(2m+3)
2
}
(9)
For different values of m, the above equation generates entangled states
which has to be distributed among different controllers. It terminates when
the value of the middle term, (N−(2m+5)/2) becomes −1. Therefore, m varies
from m = {0, 1, 2, ...., N−32 }, generating m + 1 set of GHZ-like states or N−12
set. Now, by including the first set given in equation: 8, the total number of
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GHZ-like states required for the odd number of controllers case becomes N+12 .
On termination, the terms [p′0, p
′
−1] are replaced by [a,b] and are send to the
legitimate users Alice and Bob respectively.
For even number of controllers:{
p′N
2
, p′N−2
2
, p′N+2
2
}
(10)
Similar to the odd number case, equation: 10 represents the first set of GHZ-like
state. The equation given below generates the remaining set of entangled states
depending on the value of m.{
pN−2m
2
, p′N−(2m+4)
2
, pN+(2m+2)
2
}
(11)
The above sequence of equations also terminate, when the value of middle
term (N−(2m+4)/2) becomes −1. This gives the value of m to be varying from
m = {0, 1, 2, ...., N−22 } generating m+1 set of GHZ-like state or N2 set. Again by
including the entangled state given in equation: 10, the total number of required
entangled states can be found to be N+22 . On termination, as in the previous
case, the terms [p′0, p
′
−1] are replaced by [a,b] and are send to the legitimate
users Alice and Bob respectively.
The controller C1 prepares the required number of GHZ-like states and dis-
tribute it among other controllers and users. C1 retains particle with subscripts
corresponding to his identity. After the distribution, C1 informs the controllers
possessing third particle of each GHZ-like state to measure their particle in Z
basis, which makes the other two particles of corresponding GHZ-like state col-
lapse to Bell state. C1 informs the controllers with the first particle of each
GHZ-like state to perform Bell measurement with the other particle in their
possession. Then the controllers numbering from CN−1
2
to C1 for odd number
of controllers and CN
2
to C1 for even number of controllers will perform bell
measurement on their respective particles in the decreasing order of controller
number given in subscript. After the final Bell measurement from C1, an entan-
glement channel gets established between the users to enable quantum secure
communication.
6 Security analysis and efficiency of the pro-
posed CQSC
In this section we are analysing the security of our scheme towards different
kinds of eavesdropping attacks. The most common attacks includes; intercept-
resend attack, measure-resend attack, entanglement attack etc.
The intercept-resend attack: In this attack, Eve creates N sets of GHZ-
like state, say |ζ〉xyz. She may capture the a and b sequence that have been sent
to Alice and Bob by Charlie in the step CQSC 1 and replace those a and b
sequences with her x and y sequences and resend it to Alice and Bob. However,
on the first eavesdropping check, the presence of an eavesdropper can be found
from the error rate calculated by Charlie, because of the non-correlation between
C sequence of Charlie and x, y sequences of Eve.
Likewise, Eve may again try to intercept the encoded a sequence during its
transmission from Alice to Bob. However, in the second eavesdropping check
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(CQSC 6) the presence of Eve gets revealed by the disturbance she creates on
the decoy photons. The ignorance of Eve, about the position and the basis in
which the decoy photons are created, reveals the presence of Eve.
The measure-resend attack: In this case, Eve may measure each particle
of a and b sequence during its transmission from Charlie to Alice or Bob. After
that she resend those particles to the corresponding users. However, this action
performed by Eve will destroy the entangled GHZ-like state and the presence of
Eve will get revealed in the first eavesdrop checking. Even if she captures the
message encoded a sequence, her lack of knowledge about the position and basis
with which the decoy photons are created, reveals her presence in the second
eavesdrop check.
The entangle-measure attack: In this type of attack, eavesdropper may
try to entangle her ancilla qubits with the travelling qubit sequences a and b
sent by Charlie to Alice and Bob respectively. For instance, Eve can entangle
her ancilla qubits |00〉(n)xy with the particles in the sequences a and b by two
CNOT operations. Where, n in the superscript represents the order of ancilla
bits. The particles (a, b) act as control bits and (x, y) act as target bits. The
appropriate unitary operation U is explicitly given below.
U |Ψ〉abc12 = CNOT(ax)CNOT(by)
{ |φ+〉ab |0〉c + |ψ+〉ab |1〉c√
2
}
⊗ |00〉xy
=
1
2
{|00000〉+ |01101〉+ |11011〉+ |10110〉}abcxy
=
1√
2
{(∣∣φ+〉
ab
∣∣φ+〉
xy
+
∣∣φ−〉
ab
∣∣φ−〉
xy
) |0〉c
+ (
∣∣ψ+〉
ab
∣∣ψ+〉
xy
+
∣∣ψ−〉
ab
∣∣ψ−〉
xy
) |1〉c}
The entanglement of Eve’s particles (x, y) with the qubits (a, b) creates two ad-
ditional undesired bell state results, which will increase the error in the expected
correlations by 50%. Hence in the first eavesdrop checking, Charlie can detect
the presence of an eavesdropper 50% of times. Even if Eve tries to entangle her
ancilla bits with the message encoded a sequence, Eve will get detected because
of the disturbance she creates on decoy photons. Also Eve gets restricted from
obtaining any useful information, because of the random unitary operations
performed by Bob in his b sequence before Alice encodes her secret message
on the a sequence. In our protocol we have supposed that all controllers are
trustworthy. The proposed scheme can be made more secure by the inclusion of
an identity authentication step between the users, before decoding the message.
Efficiency: Efficiency of the proposed protocol can be calculated using the
equation[21],
η =
c
q + b
(12)
where c is the number of classical bits transmitted, q is the number of qubits
used, b is the number of classical bits exchanged. For our scheme c = 2, q = 3
and b = 1. That is, we will get an efficiency of 50%.
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7 Conclusion
We have presented a controlled quantum secure communication protocol using
GHZ-like state as quantum channel and employed the dense coding technique
to increase the qubit efficiency. The sender Alice and receiver Bob are allowed
to communicate only when the controller Charlie allows them. Bob performs
random unitary operations on particle in his possession to secure the information
about shared entanglement, from the controller’s knowledge. Alice encodes
her secret messages on particles in her possession by performing one of four
different unitary operations, each corresponding to a different two bit message,
and transmits it to Bob. By performing Bell measurement on particles in his
possession, Bob read out the secret messages.
Further, we have generalized our scheme to N-controllers using a set of sim-
ilar GHZ-like states. In this multiparty controlled quantum secure communi-
cation, one of the controller prepares and efficiently distributes the entangled
states among the other controllers. The users then require the co-operation from
N controllers to begin their secret communication, which may be useful in many
practical applications. We have also shown that our protocol is secure against
common eavesdropping attacks and the qubit efficiency found to be 50%, which
is relatively higher than other existing QSDC schemes. Our protocol is feasi-
ble with the current technology as it requires only single particle measurements
and entanglement swapping to establish secure communication channel between
users. However, our protocol demands all the controllers to be trustworthy for
successful communication.
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